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Should Congress Create
a Special Category of SSA ALJs?
Byjeffrey S. Lubbers*

The

Administration (SSA) disability
the SocialhasSecurity
growth ofprogram
adjudication
been
phenomenal. In 1973, the President
of the Association ofAdministrative
Law Judges (ALJs) told a Civil Service
Commission Advisory Committee
that "Administrative Law Judges ... have
experienced a dramatic increase in the
number of disability proceedings reaching the hearing level.There were 27,972
proceedings in 1969,34,901 in 1970,
40,712 in 1971, and by fiscal year 1972
the total had jumped to an unbelievable
56,346."AJuly 30, 1974 report of the
Civil Service Comnission indicated that
the SSA employed 430 ALJs at the time,
and that the per-judge disposition rate
had fluctuated between 114.1 and 143.6
cases per year between 1969 and 1973.
Today those numbers seem miniscule.The SSA Commissioner has
testified that he expects the caseload
to reach 832,000 in fiscal year 2012
with about 1400 ALJs.' One obvious
by-product of this huge influx of cases
is that the per-judge disposition rate
has more than quadrupled from 114
per year in 1969, to 288 per year in
1976, to 594 per year in 2012.There is
no end in sight to the rapidly expanding caseload and its attendant backlogs.
Commissioner Michael Astrue has
made some progress in reducing the
backlogs from their December 2008
highs, and the average processing time
for hearing decisions has decreased
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to 442 days, down from a high of 514
days at the end of fiscal year 2008, but
this was largely because SSA hired 147
ALJs and over 1,000 support staff in
FY 2009. Nevertheless, in September
2011, according to a Syracuse University analysis: "The number of disability
cases awaiting a hearing and decision
by [SSA] continued to climb during
the most recent quarter, from July 1 to
September 30, 2011. Pending cases rose
to 771,318 at the end of this period,
up 9.3 percent from 705,367 one year
ago.
Another, perhaps related, problem is
that there have been widely reported
decisional inconsistencies in the SSA
disability adjudication system.As the
SSA Inspector General reported in
February, among the 1,256 ALJs with
200 or more dispositions in FY 2010,
the average decisional allowance rate
was about 67 percent, but the 12 ALJs
with the highest allowance rates averaged between 96.3 and 99.7 percent,
and the 12 ALJs with the lowest allowance rates averaged between 8.55 and
25.1 percent.2
SSA is aware of the inconsistency
problem and has commissioned the
Administrative Conference of the
U.S. (ACUS) to study the fairness,
efficiency, and accountability issues
raised by these inconsistencies; the
study is ongoing and I hope that it will
ultimately be useful to SSA and the
Congress when it is completed. I am
not going to prejudge the ACUS study,
but Professor Richard Pierce makes a
good point when he points to perverse
incentives that make it easier and less of
a "hassle" for ALJs to grant cases than
to deny them.' But even so, that does
not account for the rather extreme

tails of the bell curve among individual
decisionmakers, some of which appear
to be based on the location of the
hearing office.

Possible New Approaches
In the mid 2000s, SSA attempted
some short-lived disability adjudication
procedural reforms that I supported.'
But, since the reason for abandoning
many of them was that the apparently
long-term and growing caseload
problem makes it impossible to devote
enough resources to test them properly, it
would seem that the fundamental caseload problem needs to be addressed first.
A number of approaches deserve
consideration, including: (1) more
rulemaking by SSA to reduce the
number of issues that must be heard in
individual adjudications; (2) expanding
and enhancing video teleconferencing
technology; (3) modifying the role of
the Appeals Council; (4) introducing
government attorneys and adversarial
hearings in a limited number of case
categories; and (5) considering the
establishment of a Social Security

Court or tribunal. But one additional
possibility is to consider whether
SSAALJs should become a special
"breed"-especially since they make
up approximately 85% of all ALJs.

Applicability of the
Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) to SSA Adjudication
An oft-debated threshold issue
is whether the formal adjudication
provisions of the APA are applicable
to SSA disability adjudications.While
this is an interesting legal and historical

continued on next page
2 See http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/
audit/full/pdf/A-12-11-01138_0.pdf.
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question, I think

I have
supported some
beside the point
it might be appropriateto establish specialized standardsfor what
government-wide
because ultimately
changes to the
constitutes th e sort of '"ood cause" that is necessaryfor SSA to show
ALJ selection
the issue of the
APA's applicability
program, but
u
.
before the
is up to Congress.
teAISPB can discipline or remove a Social
given the
I personally think
predominance
that a close look
of SSA in the
general consensus among commentators
at the legislative
overall program,
is that it is preferable to have legally
history indicates that, in the 1970s,
I would also support tailoring a special
trained judges in such cases. 6 However,
Congress clearly ratified SSA's longselection process for SSAALJs.This
the well-documented problems with the
standing position favoring the use ofALJs
could be done in two ways-either
government-wide ALJ program,' along
in disability adjudication.Whether that
by a mandate to OPM to provide
with the systemic backlogs, might lead
might change if SSA changes its position
for specialized hiring of SSAALJs, or
Congress to introduce more flexibility
is an open question. But, as a legal matter,
by legislatively designating them as
into the process of hiring SSA judges in
theAPA certainly would permit such
"Social Security Judges" and allowing
the future. (Of course, any change would
a re-evaluation.APA Section 556, after
SSA to fashion its own hiring process
almost certainly require the grandfatherproviding for the use ofALJs in formal
that uses the OPM process as a model.
ing of current AIJs.)
adjudications, states:"This subchapter does
This latter suggestion is essentially
Perhaps the biggest frustration for
not supersede the conduct ofspecified
what has happened with the NRC
agencies with the ALJ program is
classes ofproceedings, in whole or in part,
ASLB members. For example when
the inflexibility in hiringALJs.While
by or before boards or other employees
NRC hires a lawyer member for an
designed as a merit selection program,
specially provided for by or designated
ASLB, it posts a notice of an opening
dissatisfaction with the Office of
under statute."
and conducts its own OPM-like hiring
Personnel Management (OPM) process
Thus, if Congress became persuaded
process.'The two Boards of Contract
for assembling the register of eligible
that circumstances require that the longAppeals also conduct a tailored OPMapplicants, including statutory restrictions
standing use of standard-modelALJs in
like hiring process when they hire their
on how agencies can hire judges off
SSA proceedings is no longer tenable, it
Administrative Judges.o Such a process
the register, has led most agencies to
could "specially provide for or designate"
could allow SSA to hire more judges
hire existing ALJs laterally from other
another type of adjudicator, even as it
with Social Security experience.
agencies, most often "cherry-picking"
maintains the APA procedures. Congress
Creating a specially designated catefrom SSA, which employs approximately
has done this occasionally One example
gory of Social Security Judges would
85% of the overallALJ corps. SSA, for its
was when it allowed SSA to use temporary
not necessarily require but could
part, has also experienced frustrations in
"SSI judges" for a time in the 1970s.
allow for consideration of specifically
hiring the large number ofALJs it needs.'
Another example is the special authority
germane attributes for these judges.
given to the Nuclear Regulatory ComniisFor example, given the high degree of
6 See, e.g.,ACUS Recommendation 89-10,
sion (NRC) to establish three-member
importance of caseload management
"Improved Use of Medical Personnel in Social
atomic safety and licensing boards (ASLBs)
in this huge program, Congress could
Security Disability Determinations" (Dec
using lawyers and scientists.s
consider departing from the extant
15, 1989), available at http://www.acus.gov/
In the case of the NRC, Congress
prohibition of performance ratings for
acus-recommendations/improved-use-ofwished to provide the agency with the
ALJs.While I know there are legitimate
medical-personnel-in-social-securitydisability-determinations.
flexibility to not only use law-trained
arguments on the other side of this
' See PAUL R.VERKUIL,DANIEL GIFFoRD,
judges to hear licensing cases but also
CHARLEs KoCH, RIcHARD PIERCE, &JEFFREY S.
scientists.While there might be some
LuBBERns,THE EDERALADMINSTRATIVEJUDICIARY,
basis to open up the SSA adjudicator
1992 REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
continued on page 15
roster to medical experts, I think the
ADMINISTRATIVE CONF.OF THE U.S. 773 (VOL.2).
it is somewhat

' See 42 U.S.C.5 2241.There are also
numerous non-APA hearing provisions
(such as those for immigration cases, public
employee disciplinary cases, and government
contract appeals) where Congress has specially
designated the use of non-ALJ adjudicators.
See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the
Questfor Uniformity Faltering?,10 ADMIN. L.
J.AM. U. 65, 70-71 (1996) (regarding use of
non-APAjudges).
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' See the position paper of Ronald Bernoski,
President, Ass'n ofAdministrative LawJudges,
"Recommendations on the Social Security Case
Backlog" at p. 3 0 (January 2008) (on file with
author) (suggesting that"OPM has shown that
it is incapable ofproviding the American public
with the'best qualified' administrative lawjudges").
Judge Bernoski's proposed solution is to remove
the government-wide ALJ program from OPM
and give it to a separate AJ-run conference. I
would prefer a more limited approach that deals
specifically with the SSAALJ corps.
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See, e.g., the extensive requirements detailed
in this job opening notice for a lawyer panel
member: http://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/
ViewDetails/2284269#.
o See 42 U.S.C. § 7105, (providing that the
members of the Armed Services and Civilian Boards of Contract Appeals are to be
appointed by DOD and GSA using a process
that mirrors the one used for ALJs, except that
they must have five years of experience in
public contract law).They also have their own
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